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a citizen's interest in the availability of public schools and his interest in the
availability of public swimming facilites has no constitutional basis.4"
V. CONCLUSION
Since Wright was not considered by the Supreme Court, and since Wright
was decided after the Court had rendered its opinion in Palmer, the Court could
not possibly have considered Wright in determining whether the closing of
Jackson's pools violated its Negro citizens' rights to equal protection. However,
the Court's failure to consider Bush in reaching its decision in Palmer leaves
the observer somewhat confused. It is now clear that the effect of closing certain
public recreational facilities is the controlling factor in determining whether
racial discrimination is encouraged by such official conduct. However, the effect
that must follow in order to present a case of unlawful discrimination is open
to conjecture. The effects in Bush and Palmer seem indistinguishable. The only
distinction between the two cases seems to be their opposite holdings.
Jay Garrett
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Sixty percent of the population of Shaw, Mississippi, was black and ninety-
seven percent of the black population lived in areas where no whites resided.
Ninety-eight percent of all homes that fronted on unpaved streets and ninety-
seven percent of the homes not served by sanitary sewers were in black neigh-
borhoods. There were comparable statistics in relation to street lighting, surface
water drainage, water mains, fire hydrants, and traffic control apparatus.' These
municipal services were provided out of general revenues and without any
special assessments. Black citizens of Shaw brought a class action against city
officials, seeking to enjoin them from continuing to discriminate on the basis
of race in the provision of these municipal services. The federal district court
" Perhaps one further distinguishing factor between Wright and Palmer is that in the
latter case the state was closing all its pools, while in the former the state was closing only
one of its public schools.
' Street lighting in the black areas was provided by bare bulb fixtures. The more modern
high-power mercury vapor street lights had been installed in white neighborhoods. White
areas had either underground storm sewers or a continuous system of drainage ditches, while
the black neighborhoods had a poorly maintained system of drainage ditches or no surface
water drainage system at all. The two areas of the town in which water pressure was most
inadequate were areas where sixty-three percent of the town's black population resided.
Neither the opinion of the trial court nor the opinion of the appellate court disclosed the
relative distribution of fire hydrants or traffic control devices, but the appellate court noted
that the evidence indicated that the black areas were "severely disadvantaged" with respect
to these services.
2The plaintiff sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1971):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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found that the services were provided on a rational basis without intentional
racial discrimination; injunctive relief was denied.3 Held, reversed and remand-
ed: Statistical evidence of racial discrimination in the provision of municipal
services will establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination; this denial of
the right to equal protection of the laws could not be justified since a compel-
ling state interest was not shown. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286
(5th Cir. 1971).
I. THE RISE OF THE NEW EQUAL PROTECTION
There is a growing body of law that "constitutes an increasingly significant
exception to the long-established rule that a statute does not deny equal pro-
tection if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective."4 In
areas within this exception to the general rule a compelling state interest must
be shown in order to justify the classification. The United States Supreme Court
has recognized two kinds of situations that demand the imposition of this strict-
er test. The first kind involves any classification based on "suspect" criteria,
such as classifications based on race.' The second type of situation is one involv-
ing a fundamental right, such as voting.6
Probably as a result of the historical origin of the equal protection clause,7
the first classification to attract attention as a suspect criterion was one based on
race.' In Korematsu v. United States9 the Supreme Court stated that "all legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediate-
ly suspect ... [and] courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."'" In
Korematsu the Court concluded that a compelling state interest requiring the
racial classification was present. However, in many subsequent cases the Court
applied this same standard to classifications based on race and was unable to
find such a compelling state interest." Recently, the Court has looked with
close judicial scrutiny at classifications based on wealth.1" This development in
the law is now referred to as the "new equal protection.""
II. EQUAL PROTECTION AND MUNICIPAL SERVICES
It was decided in an early case that to confer a greater benefit upon one citi-
'Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 303 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
'Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969). For a discussion of the traditional
limited interpretation of the equal protection clause see Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
'Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
'Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
7The fourteenth amendment, one of the post-Civil War amendments, was adopted in
1868.
'The legislative purpose of the clause was discussed as early as the Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873): "[I1n any fair and just construction of any sec-
tion or phrase of these amendments [the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments),
it is necessary to look to the purpose which . . . was the pervading spirit of them all."
1323 U.S. 214 (1944).
"°Id. at 216.
" See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
" McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (semble). However,
in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), the majority of the Court appears to have
ignored the plaintiff's claim that wealth is a suspect criterion under the fourteenth amend-
ment.
" Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
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zen than upon another by the institution of a public improvement did not deny
the latter citizen equal protection of the laws.' So long as both citizens had ac-
cess to the improvement, any incidental discrimination was considered to be a
natural consequence of official decisionmaking.5 Thus, a "reasonableness" test
was applied to the official action to determine if there was a violation of a citi-
zen's right to equal protection,"0 and a presumption of reasonableness attached
to the discretionary acts of municipal officials.17
The courts have recently considered two cases involving discrimination in
the provision of municipal services. In Hadnott v. City of Prattville," the plain-
tiff sought a ruling that city officials had violated his right to equal protection
in providing street paving, fire hydrants, lighting, and a sewerage system. As
to lighting and fire hydrants, the court reached the factual conclusion that they
were not provided on a discriminatory basis.19 With regard to street paving and
sewerage systems, the court noted that such improvements were paid for by
assessments and that the plaintiffs had never petitioned the municipal authori-
ties requesting such improvements. Therefore, the plaintiffs were not denied
their right to equal protection of the laws because "the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution was not designed to compel
uniformity in the face of difference."'" In Coleman v. Aycock 1 the plaintiffs
alleged discrimination in the provision of sewerage systems and street paving.
The court found that only slight discrimination existed, that this discrimination
"4Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
1 The general rule, therefore, is well settled that the exercise of discretionary
power by the proper municipal authorities within the prescribed legal limits,
relating to public improvements of the several kinds, concerning which reason-
able differences of opinion may exist, in good faith, without fraud, oppression
or arbitrary action, will not be reviewed by the courts.
13 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 37.25 (3d ed. 1971).
" Once any municipal improvement is made, the municipal authorities have much less
discretion in limiting the right to use the improvement. For example, Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), declared that public schools could not be segregated on the
basis of race without violating the right to equal protection of the laws. Later decisions de-
clared that a municipality could not discriminate on the basis of race in the provision of
other kinds of public facilities. See, e.g., Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963);
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cit. 1955), afl'd, 350
U.S. 877 (1956). But cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), which held that a
city had not violated the equal protection clause when it closed its municipal swimming
pools after it had been ordered to desegregate the pools.
1United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1 (1926); Thompson v. Housing
Auth., 251 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Fla. 1966); Barnes v. City of Gadsden, 174 F. Supp. 64
(N.D. Ala. 1958), afl'd, 268 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1959).
1 309 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
19Id. at 971. Apparently these services were provided with funds from the general reve-
nues. The court held that the criteria upon which the decisions concerning the placement
of street lighting and fire hydrants were based were reasonable. Therefore, there was no de-
nial of the right to equal protection in the provision of these services. The opinion gives
no indication of the statistical distribution of the street lights and fire hydrants. Under
Hawkins if there was statistical evidence of racial discrimination in the provision of these
services, this showing of reasonable criteria would seem to be insufficient to meet the strict
scrutiny test which would be invoked.
"0Id. at 970. In municipalities that make municipal improvements by assessment, the
landowner petitions the local government for the improvement, the municipal government
makes the improvement, and the landowner is assessed for the cost. When improvements are
made from general revenues, the municipal government appropriates monies collected from
sales, realty, and franchise taxes for making municipal improvements. Many municipalities
use one method to supply one service and the other method to supply another service. See
14 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 38 (3d ed. 1971).
2304 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
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was not based on race, and that the municipal authorities were acting "in good
faith" to eliminate the discrimination. It followed that there was no violation
of the plaintiffs' right to equal protection.2
III. HAWKINS V. TOWN OF SHAW
In Hawkins v. Town of Shaw the federal district court concluded that the
discrimination in the provision of municipal services was not based upon
a racial classification.' That quantitative and qualitative differences existed be-
tween the services which the city provided to white residents and those which
were provided to black residents was obvious. Thus, some form of discrimina-
tion existed. However, the district court decided that since there was no showing
of intent to discriminate on the basis of race, the services were allocated on
some presumptively rational basis. This finding ruled out the possibility that a
suspect criterion was involved.' Therefore, the reasonableness test was appli-
cable, making it unnecessary to examine the disparity with close judicial scru-
tiny.' The district court concluded that the city officials demonstrated a ration-
al basis for the obvious inequalities such that the reasonableness test was satis-
fied."
The Fifth Circuit applied a different test. The overwhelming statistical evi-
dence prompted the court to recognize that "figures speak, and when they do
courts listen."2 " The statistics demonstrated a prima facie case of racial discrimi-
nation.2" Intent was simply not critical in demonstrating a classification based
upon race. Because the court determined that a racial classification was involved,
it proceeded to apply the compelling interest test." The discretionary acts of
the municipal officials could not meet the more stringent standard. Therefore,
the court concluded that the petitioners were being denied their right to the
equal protection of the laws.2'
22 Id. at 146. Interestingly, the court relies upon the district court opinion in Hawkins
to support its statement that a "good faith" effort is sufficient.
28303 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Miss. 1969), rev'd, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cit. 1971).
24303 F. Supp. at 1169.
25 Id.2 8Nor could plaintiff rely upon denial of a fundamental right to invoke close judicial
scrutiny. It has never been held that there is a fundamental right to municipal services. But
cf. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), in which
the Supreme Court of California, in apparently holding the state property tax system of
school financing unconstitutional, found a fundamental right to education.
27 The district court concluded that the streets were paved according to use, that sewerage
was provided to all except those who had not installed the proper receiving facilities, that
the street lighting in black areas had not been shown to be inadequate, that traffic control
apparatus and fire hydrants were provided equally, and that surface water drainage was a
problem for both black and white residents. 303 F. Supp. at 1164-66.
2s437 F.2d at 1288, quoting Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 9 (5th Cir. 1966).
29 The statistical evidence method of proof has apparently not been applied successfully
in the municipal services area before. However, in the past it has been used to show dis-
crimination in the extension of the right to vote, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960); in the selection of a jury, United States ex rel. Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53 (5th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 915 (1963); and in the selection of teachers, United
States v. Board of Educ., 396 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1968).
"
0 See notes 5, 6 supra, and accompanying text.
31 With respect to sewerage systems, which the court found were now being provided
on a nondiscriminatory basis, the court said: "[The fact that extensions are now made to
new areas in a non-discriminatory manner is not sufficient when the effect of such a policy
is to 'freeze in' the results of past discrimination." 437 F.2d at 1290.
19711
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Having once determined that racial discrimination existed, it was necessary
for the appellate court to devise a remedy. The district court had stated that it
did not have the power to give the plaintiffs relief even if it found that racial
discrimination existed. The Fifth Circuit ordered the town to submit a plan for
the court's approval explaining how the town proposed to eliminate the results
of the past discrimination. The court based its authority to promulgate such an
order on section 1983, title forty-two."
IV. THE IMPACT OF HAWKINS
The significance of Hawkins is not that the court recognized that there was
a violation of the plaintiffs' rights under the equal protection clause. The man-
ner in which the court arrived at that conclusion, however, makes the case note-
worthy.
The Fifth Circuit looked to statistical evidence, an approach that had not
previously been used in the area of municipal services.' A demonstration of
intent to discriminate was unnecessary. 4 The statistical evidence itself establish-
ed a prima facie case of racial discrimination, a classification that can be justified
only by demonstrating a compelling state interest. The burden of proof was
then shifted to the defendants to justify the discrimination by showing the ex-
istence of such an interest.'
The introduction of this approach into the area of municipal services will
have far-reaching effects. In the past when racial discrimination was alleged,
it was possible for the defendant to refute the charge by showing that there
was no intent to discriminate on the basis of race. By showing that there was
no intent to discriminate on the basis of race, the defendant was able to avoid
the closer scrutiny which a racial classification invokes. Then, because of the
presumption of reasonableness that attaches to the discretionary acts of munici-
pal officials,' the defendant could usually satisfy the requirements of the ration-
al basis test.7 However, using the court's approach in Hawkins, intent to dis-
criminate need not be directly proven."8 Furthermore, evidence of lack of intent
32 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1971). See note 2 supra. In Harkless v. Sweeney, 427 F.2d 319(5th Cit. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971), the Fifth Circuit held that a munici-
pality is a person under § 1983 for purposes of equitable relief. Hawkins was reheard by
the Fifth Circuit, en banc, on October 21, 1971. The oral argument was directed to the
issue of whether a municipality is a person for purposes of equitable relief under § 1983.
There are a number of cases holding that a municipality is not a person for purposes of §
1983 relief. The leading case is Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), in which the Su-
preme Court held that a municipality is not a person under the statute. In Harkless the
court distinguished Monroe on the ground that in Monroe the plaintiff was seeking damages,
while in Harkless equitable relief was sought. Should the court decide that a municipality
is not a person for purposes of equitable relief under § 1983, equitable relief would still be
available against officers of the municipality. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
" See note 29 supra.
" This approach is not surprising in view of the decision in Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk
Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968). See note 40 infra.
' Rather than demonstrating a compelling state interest, the defendant might elect to
refute the statistical evidence itself. For a discussion of the procedural implications of this
case see Fessler & Harr, Beyond the Wrong Side of the Tracks: Municipal Services in the
Interstices of Procedure, 6 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 441 (1971).
'See note 15 supra.
3 7 See note 4 supra, and accompanying text.
"8437 F.2d at 1292.
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to discriminate is not sufficient to refute the charge.' By introducing statistical
evidence establishing the fact of racial discrimination, the more stringent stan-
dard of the new equal protection is invoked. This is the better approach because
when a racially discriminatory result is found, whether or not that result was
intended seems irrelevant."
Few could deny that the statistical evidence introduced in Hawkins clearly
demonstrated a racially discriminatory effect in the provision of municipal
services. The statistical evidence produced in subsequent cases may prove some-
what less shocking than the facts and figures presented to the court in Hawkins.
It will remain for future courts to decide exactly what minimum standards sta-
tistical evidence must meet in order to establish discrimination based on race.
It should be noted that the result in Hawkins does not necessarily mean that
all instances of disparity in the provision of municipal services can now be re-
moved by simply introducing statistical evidence to demonstrate the disparity.
This is so even if the disparity seems to be drawn on racial lines. The munici-
pal services in the town of Shaw were provided from the general revenues."
Therefore, in communities in which special assessments are made for some or
all of these services,4" it would seem that, as to those improvements for which
assessments are made, the citizen must still request that his property be assessed
in order to provide the revenue for the improvement. If the citizen has not re-
quested the assessment, he would not be in a position to allege discrimination
in the provision of municipal services. Hence, the decision in Hadnott v. City
of Prattville" would be unaffected by Hawkins. The source of the funds used
to pay for the improvements would appear to be a legitimate point of distinc-
tion between the two cases."
V. CONCLUSION
Because the decision in Hawkins will cause courts to look to the substantive
results of an administrative decision rather than to the frame of mind of those
making the decision, it may serve to remove a barrier that in the past has si-
lently prevented black citizens from enjoying equal services from their munici-
pal governments. It would seem that the analysis used in this case will apply
" In Billingsley v. Clayton, 359 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 841
(1966), the court looked to the defendant's intent and concluded that the absence of in-
tent to discriminate rebutted the prima facie case of discrimination which plaintiffs had
established with statistical evidence. However, in Billingsley plaintiffs were alleging intent
to discriminate in the selection of jurors. In Hawkins plaintiffs were not alleging intent, as
such, but were alleging racial discrimination in the result. This distinction may account for
what appear to be inconsistent holdings.4
"[T~he arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private
rights and the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme." Norwalk CORE v. Nor-
walk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931 (2d Cir. 1968).
41437 F.2d at 1294 (concurring opinion).
, See note 20 supra.
309 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Ala. 1970). See notes 18-20 supra, and accompanying text.
"However, a community could not avoid the application of the Hawkins rationale by
discontinuing the general revenue approach and initiating a special assessment scheme for
all subsequent municipal improvements. The effect of such an action would be to "freeze
in" the results of past discrimination. Since Hawkins expressly rejects this "freeze in" tac-
tic, a town that had previously used a general revenue plan would probably be compelled
to continue to use general revenues to remove the results of past discriminations. See note
31 supra.
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